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Abstract: 
The political philosopher, photography theoretician and artist Ariella Azoulay  has constructed an 
influential theoretical, curatorial and artistic body of work in which she aims at pushing our 
spectatorial imagination as far as is possible. She proposes no less than an understanding of 
engaged visual art as a most powerful tool in order to plant the seeds of new human rights. At 
first sight, such intentions may sound utterly utopian. For justified reasons, contemporary art 
theory is often situated as stopping short at the relatively inoperative level of “a virtual 
community between spectators” (Sliwinski, 2011). Nonetheless, proposals for an engaged visual 
art that takes up a concrete position may be less wild than one would at first think. Human rights 
have, historically, always resulted from growing social consensus, and often in direct response to 
indignation about stories that had come to see the light of day. 
Our paper starts from the work of Azoulay, in particular her video Civil Alliance (2012). The 
paper examines the role such an engaged visual art can play in this mechanism today, as a 
privileged instrument for activating a mobilizing potential with regard to rethinking human 
solidarity in contemporary society. Underlying our collaboration lies the hypothesis that true 
interdisciplinary dialogue may help overcome skepticism about the lack of influence of engaged 
visual art. Having shown how Azoulay‟s art and curatorial work leads to her theoretical positions 
on human rights, our paper explores how some of these might translate into international law. 
Azoulay‟s „universal spectator‟ – an implied absentee presence in the act of photography 
(Azoulay, 2008) – arguably is a central implied figure in international human rights law: human 
rights law breaks into the sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty turning horror and injustice 
into universal concerns. This legitimizes the role of international bodies that hold states and 
individuals responsible for human rights violations. This institutional turn, however, shuts out any 
role for an individual who is not directly involved in a human rights violation (either as a victim 
or as a perpetrator). 
In our paper, we aim to start thinking such a role in legal terms. Azoulay has conceived of the 
role of the spectator in the first place as a duty- an obligation to struggle against injuries inflicted 
on others and to avoid and resist political and economic situations that give rise to structural 
human rights violations (Azoulay, 2008). The paper examines several ways in which Azoulay‟s 
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insights might be integrated in international law, as duties or as rights, either substantive or 
procedural. Our working hypothesis is that the most promising pathway implies a universal right 
of standing to challenge human rights violations. 
In addition, Azoulay‟s „right not become a perpetrator‟ can be examined as a way of 
conceptualizing victimhood in perpetrators of human rights violations. This exploration starts 
from Azoulay‟s argument that the recruitment of citizens taking part in human rights violations – 
in casu drafting citizens for service in the Israeli army in the occupied territories-  should in itself 
be a human rights violation (Azoulay, 2011). 
Keywords: engaged visual art; international human rights law; Ariella Zoulay. 
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1.Introduction  
 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, a „legal turn‟ has taken place within the visual arts. 
Artists, art theoreticians, art critics and curators have increasingly paid attention to human rights. 
Concerned about the numerous problems posed by the global crisis of the capitalist economy, 
they have sought for valid means to express social commitment. As human rights law is a 
dominant language for talking about injustice, it has proven highly inspirational. Artists have 
contributed to raise public awareness by exposing human rights violations in their works. A 
recent example of this engagement from the art world has been the acclaimed exhibition 
'Newtopia: The State of Human Rights' (Mechelen, 2012). The idea is not entirely new: ten years 
earlier, the world-leading visual art exhibition Documenta in Kassel (2002) was organized  in 
order to exchange ideas about human rights issues (Enwezor et al., 2002). Documenta 11 
consolidated creative processes that developed throughout the 1990s, in the wake of the 
influential legacy of critically engaged visual art since the early 1970s.Academic research 
programs engaged with this dynamic, e.g. the interdisciplinary Human Rights Project at Bard 
College, founded in 1999.  
In such a productive climate, many visual artists now feel encouraged to move beyond merely 
representing human rights conformity to the artist‟s perception of current human rights standards. 
They thus enter into a critical dialogue with some of these standards‟ reigning norms and 
predominant mechanisms. Often they do so in collaboration with visual art theoreticians, art 
critics and curators - a group we further identify as “art researchers” (Van Gelder, 2011). This 
paper focuses on one artist who may be situated in this school of thought. Through this case, we 
study the role of both engaged visual art making and visual art research for advancing the 
constant process of normative development that characterizes international human rights law. 
Until today, most of the engagement of human rights scholarship with the visual realm has been 
in relation to photography. More precisely, when discussing the human rights relevance of 
photography, scholars focus on photojournalism, with only scant attention paid to art photographs 
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(e.g. Möller, 2010). They proceed from an instrumental approach, discussing the role and limits 
of photojournalistic pictures in exposing human rights violations and triggering reactions 
(Gregory,2006; Kennedy, 2007; Noble, 2010; Batchen, 2012). Additionally, critical approaches 
may be found, e.g. arguing that photographic representations of human rights violations may 
reproduce harmful stereotypes (Bleiker & Kay, 2007). Only occasionally has it been claimed that 
photographic images may also contribute to shaping human rights discourse (Joyce, 2010; 
Linfield, 2011).  
Yet many believe that visual artists and visual art researchers may be among the actors who may 
advance the field of human rights. European Commission President José Manuel Barroso recently 
said that "artists are the unacknowledged legislators of this world” (Barroso,2014). Our paper 
examines the role engaged visual art can play today as an instrument for activating a mobilizing 
potential with regard to rethinking human solidarity in contemporary society. Underlying our 
collaboration lays the hypothesis that true interdisciplinary dialogue may help overcome 
skepticism about the lack of influence of engaged visual art. This paper is a first attempt at 
collaboration between an art researcher (Hilde Van Gelder) and a scholar of human rights law 
(Eva Brems) that we hope will develop into a fully-fledged research project. 
In the first part, Hilde Van Gelder shows how Ariella Azoulay‟s artistic and curatorial work leads 
to her theoretical positions on human rights, i.e. how visual art talks to international human rights 
law in this case, and what it has to say. In the second part, Eva Brems explores whether and how 
international human rights law may rise to the challenge and address the claims put forward by 
the artist and art researcher. 
 
2. Visual Art Talks to International Law 
 
In the Spring of 2012, the political philosopher, photography theoretician and artist Ariella 
Azoulay created an exhibition at both STUK Contemporary Arts Centre in Leuven (Belgium) and 
the Center for Digital Art in Holon (Israel). Inside a black box, Azoulay‟s video, Civil Alliance 
(2012), was on view. This 52:36 minutes long work portrays people of mixed Palestinian and 
Jewish background dressed in mid-twentieth-century clothing, who gather around a circular table 
that depicts a map of Mandatory Palestine. The group recites short stories in Arabic and Hebrew 
about civilian engagements and agreements achieved between January 1947 and May 1948. 
These narrated fragments testify to a joint civilian will to imagine a peaceful coexistence in the 
various villages that are marked, one by one, with dots on a map. 
Azoulay provided a larger context for Civil Alliance via mostly black-and-white photographs 
encountered in formerly undisclosed Zionist archives, which she both installed on the projection 
room‟s exterior walls and  reproduced in a foldable booklet that was available for free in the 
exhibition room. When it was completely folded, the booklet‟s cover displayed only part of a 
photographic image, which shows a man in a costume holding firmly someone‟s hand.  Upon 
opening, one finds that the second person is an Arab man. Further opening of the booklet allows 
for the discovery of a caption that reads: “Ya‟acov Epstein holding hands with jabri Amin el Haj 
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during a visit of Jewish settlers from Zichron Ya‟acov at the Arab village of Subrin. 
Photographer: Zoltan Kluger, GPO 20.01.1940.”From the left hand side of the picture, which 
reveals a third person‟s arm or back, one sees that the two men were not alone in the room. 
Azoulay comments on this in the booklet, writing that the presence of other men provides a 
“public meaning” to these two men‟s encounter “that transcends their personal relations.” She 
adds to this that “these openly public gestures of proximity turn them into a promise made in 
view of witnesses, one of whom is the photographer.” Thus, the picture unfolds before our eyes 
into a strong image of a „civil alliance.‟ 
In the exhibition, Azoulay combined such images with self-written mural text fragments. Titled 
Potential History (2012), the sequence began with a contemporary color photograph of an 
encrusted wooden box that was looted from the former Palestinian village of Deir Yassin. The 
text fragment tells us the following: 
“The agreement between the inhabitants of Deir Yassin and Giv‟at Shaul was violated not 
by local residents but rather by Jewish militiamen. This wooden box was looted from one 
of the houses in Deir Yassin and kept in the home of one of the Jewish assailants. For years 
its provenance was an open secret in the house where it was kept. It is now in my keeping. 
I regard it as a priceless deposit placed in my keeping until the story of this place be 
rewritten, until life as it was known here until the curse of partition took hold of it would be 
retold, and conditions would transpire for founding a shared museum – to tell how the 
national war machine ground to dust civil hopes for shared life. In this box borrowed time 
is stored.” 
Now in Azoulay‟s possession, the box became a tool for her to claim the “right not to be a 
perpetrator.” She has, on the same occasion, pleaded for forgiveness and promise by making a 
case for the universal right of each and every one on this planet “to imagine one‟s future.” 
Our paper zooms in on Azoulay‟s first claim, that of installing “a right not to be a perpetrator”. 
Looting and destroying civilian property under circumstances of war is a violation of 
international law (cf. Geneva Convention). Basing herself on the metaphorical potential of this 
tiny box, Azoulay not only expresses her firm will but also claims her fundamental right to no 
longer participate in the continuation of such perpetrations today. She pleads for a “new 
declaration of human rights,” which should not only protect victims of human rights violations, 
but also protect individuals who esteem that they are susceptible of becoming (co-)perpetrators of 
a human rights violation – even if only passively, not actively committing the violation. These 
individuals should be conferred a concrete right to refuse contributing to such perpetrations. She 
writes: a truly workable “declaration of human rights […] should be based on the assumption that 
every time a right is violated, another right is also violated with it – the right not to be a 
perpetrator (Azoulay, 2013a, 42).” 
In recent years, Ariella Azoulay has thus constructed an influential theoretical, curatorial and 
artistic body of work in which she aims at pushing our spectatorial imagination as far as is 
possible. She proposes no less than an understanding of engaged visual art as a most powerful 
tool in order to plant the seeds of new human rights. At first sight, such intentions may sound 
utterly utopian. For justified reasons, contemporary art theory is often situated as stopping short at 
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the relatively inoperative level of visual imagination. Our ambition is to explore under what 
conditions the visual arts can rise above the relatively inoperative level of “a virtual community 
between spectators” (as Sharon Sliwinski has eloquently called it, 2011) and realize impact on the 
ground. Proposals for an engaged visual art that takes up a concrete position may be less wild 
than one would at first think. Human rights have, historically, always resulted from growing 
social consensus, and often in direct response to indignation about stories that had come to see the 
light of day. 
Samuel Moyn, in the catalogue to the exhibition Newtopia: The State of Human Rights, which 
was held almost two years ago in Mechelen (Belgium), urges human rights law to reinvent itself 
by moving beyond its currently reigning standards. If human rights law finds itself in an impasse 
today, he argues, this is because it relies too much on the judges in the courts and has insufficient 
contact with the grassroots movements. As a result, it often lacks the reality checks made by such 
movements, which express human rights claims that do not necessarily reproduce the 
predominant status quo within the field of human rights, but instead represent human rights as 
they could or should be in the eyes of these activists. It is our primary assumption that engaged 
visual art, and specifically the work of Azoulay, can be understood as such a productive 
„grassroots movement.‟ 
 
3. How International Law may Engage with Visual Art (Research) 
 
How can international law – and in particular international human rights law/international 
humanitarian law/international criminal law – respond to all this? If international lawyers want to 
take these claims seriously, what does this imply? As to whytotake it seriously, we submit that 
this type of artistic activism is one of many types of bottom-up expressions/reflections about 
adequate responses to injustice. Bottom-up dynamics have often played a role in the formulation 
of new international standards or the adjustment of existing standards. We refer to the role of 
women‟s organizations around the globe in getting domestic violence recognized as a human 
rights violation and sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity. Other examples 
that have been explored in recent scholarship include the role of associations of families of 
disappeared persons in Latin America in the debates on the emerging right to the truth (Naftali), 
and the role of peasant movements in advancing a right to food sovereignty (Claeys). Compared 
to such movements, artists are of course a different kind of actor, yet this difference does not 
make them less worthy of being taken seriously. One, this is an actor that may suffer less from the 
myopia that may characterize the involvement in a highly personal struggle, as is the case for 
many grassroots movements; and two, this is an actor that arguably moves in a sphere that 
facilitates out of the box thinking above and beyond politics. 
A. A legal Role for the Universal Spectator 
 
As discussed above, Ariella Azoulay talks about a „universal spectator‟ as an implied absentee 
presence in the act of photography. Arguably there is a similar central implied figure in 
international human rights law: human rights law breaks into the sacrosanct principle of state 
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sovereignty to turn horror and injustice into universal concerns. Human rights law and discourse 
thus bring in the eyes of the world. Wherever injustice is committed, the world is watching, and 
may call perpetrators to account. In that sense, the universal spectator in international human 
rights law does more than looking. Because of the strong normativity of human rights, the 
universal human rights spectator is always to some extent a universal prosecutor or judge. The 
human rights „system‟ has institutionalized this universal spectatorship: the fact that injustice has 
been made a universal concern legitimizes the role of international bodies that hold states and 
individuals accountable for human rights violations. This institutional turn, however, risks 
shutting out the role of individuals who are not directly involved in a human rights violation 
(either as a victim or as a perpetrator). 
The strong ethical power of human rights that is felt – or supposed to be felt – by all human 
beings as spectators of human rights violations is thus not matched by a legal role for human 
beings generally in addressing human rights violations.  
Yet we may try to imagine such a legal role for the universal spectator. It is submitted that this 
can be conceived in at least three ways, i.e. as a duty, as a substantive right and as a procedural 
right. It is not possible in this paper to thoroughly discuss these different scenarios. This paper has 
the focused yet limited ambition to „translate‟ claims that were expressed in an artistic context 
into research questions in the field of international law. However, we intend to go further in the 
years to come and, indeed, address these research questions with an interdisciplinary team of 
human rights lawyers and art researchers in close contact with engaged visual artists. 
In what follows, we shall briefly point out how the search for a legal role for the universal 
spectator may translate into questions of duties and of substantive rights, before going a bit more 
deeply into the matter of procedural rights, which in our opinion seems to offer the most 
promising prospects. 
B. Imagining the Legal Duties of the Universal Spectator 
 
Azoulay has conceived of the role of the spectator in the first place as a duty- an obligation to 
struggle against injuries inflicted on others and to avoid and resist political and economic 
situations that give rise to structural human rights violations (Azoulay, 2008). Ethically speaking, 
this is a big claim which may in many cases result in a duty of mandatory heroism. It is true that 
systems of oppression and discrimination -from the holocaust and apartheid to the discrimination 
of women- cannot subsist without the silent collaboration – or at least the collaborative silence – 
of numerous people, many of whom may directly or indirectly benefit from such systems.  For 
this reason, the idea of a legal duty to resist structural human rights violations cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. It resonates moreover with the provision in the UN Declaration on Human 
Rights Defenders, fully the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. This text declares a responsibility „in safeguarding democracy, 
promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and 
advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes‟, as well as a responsibility in 
contributing to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which 
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human rights can be fully realized (Article 18).Efforts to make these responsibilities concrete and 
operational, let alone legally binding, remain to be made. 
At the same time, one may think of a number of more specific duties that offer better prospects of 
feasibility, as well as of ways to legally facilitate living by an ethical duty to resist human rights 
violations. 
In the first category, one may explore for instance the feasibility of an international duty to assist 
victims or potential victims of human rights violations.
1
 In our opinion, a legal obligation to 
protect a concrete individual against a serious human rights violation that this person is suffering, 
or that is imminent, when one is in a position to do so -presumably with only limited risk to 
oneself-offers significantly better prospects than a legal obligation to resist a structural system of 
oppression.  
Another limited duty one may conceive of is the duty to bring to light human rights violations 
that one has knowledge of -for example in the exercise of one‟s profession, even where secrecy 
rules apply- so as to enable the competent authorities to hold perpetrators accountable. If 
international law formulated such individual duties, they would oblige states to enact them in 
their legislation and attach sanctions to them. 
The second category may offer an alternative or a first step to what is described above. Instead of 
obliging individuals to become whistle blowers or to take other steps that may be perceived as 
risks to themselves, this scenario would leave this as a matter of free choice, yet focus on 
containing or reducing the risks attached. This would imply for instance that states would need to 
have whistle blowers‟ protection measures in place for those who bring to the light violations of 
human rights.
2
 And states would be obliged to protect individuals who intervene in order to 
protect others against actual or potential human rights violations, against the risks such 
individuals run and possibly also against any sanctions for offences that may be committed in 
doing so. The latter is not a new human rights obligation (cf. UN Human Rights Defenders 
Declaration, Article 12).
3
 
                                                     
1
 We refer to the Belgian criminal law provision that makes it a criminal offence not to offer assistance to a 
person in serious danger. 
2
Cf. Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member 
States on the protection of whistleblowers was adopted on 30 April 2014. It recommends that member 
States have in place a normative, institutional and judicial framework to protect individuals who, in the 
context of their work-based relationship, report or disclose information on threats or harm to the public 
interest. 
3
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities 
against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2. The State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of 
everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or 
de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her 
legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration. 
3. In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be protected 
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C. Imagining the Legal Rights of the Universal Spectator 
 
When we think of individuals who are not directly concerned with a situation in which human 
rights are violated, and of the rights of such individuals pertaining to such violations, we can 
imagine these as substantive rights or as procedural rights.  
a) An Individual Substantive Right Concerning the Human Rights of Others?  
 
One may imagine a „light‟ version of such a right that consists essentially of the right to protest 
and advocate against violations of the human rights of others. This is a crucial right that, 
however, is not new as it concerns the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and other 
rights of human rights defenders (See UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration). 
A bolder version would be the right to live in a society where no structural or gross human rights 
violations occur. This comes closer to what Ariella Azoulay means with the right for the spectator 
not to become a perpetrator. It expresses the idea that human rights violations happening to others 
also damage our common humanity. Arguably this is what is meant by Article 28 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which reads  „Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized‟. In that 
sense, it is not a new idea. Yet, while most rights expressed in the UDHR have been repeated and 
further developed in other international texts that are legally binding, this is not the case for this 
right. It is as yet not very clear what the practical effects of such a right would be, yet this is 
certainly worth exploring. 
In addition to the autonomous meaning of this substantive right, it is submitted that it may also 
function as the substantive underpinning for the procedural right discussed infra. 
In addition, Azoulay builds on the „right not to become a perpetrator‟ to make the very concrete 
claim that the recruitment of citizens taking part in human rights violations – in casu drafting 
citizens for service in the Israeli army in the occupied territories-  should in itself be a human 
rights violation (Azoulay, 2011). Currently international law includes such a ban only for child 
soldiers; it would seem an overly radical move to extend it to citizens generally, especially as 
every soldier was at one point a civilian, and every military operation in times of war may result 
in war crimes or other violations of international law. Yet in this context as well, one may at the 
same time explore the matter further, and start thinking of lighter, more feasible approaches that 
realize part of the same ambition. In that sense, one may think of alternative ways of protecting 
citizens from becoming complicit in human rights violations and of conceptualizing victimhood 
in perpetrators of human rights violations. This may include a reflection on the right to 
conscientious objection to military service and beyond, and the right to refuse to violate human 
                                                                                                                                                              
effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means, activities and acts, 
including those by omission, attributable to States that result in violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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rights
4
as well as on appropriate accountability mechanisms for individuals who may be 
characterized as victim-perpetrators. 
b) An Individual Procedural Right Concerning the Human Rights of Others 
 
In our opinion, the most straightforward answer to the artistic appeal for the right of the spectator 
not to be a perpetrator is not the creation of a new substantive legal right, but rather the extension 
of a procedural right, in other words access to a remedy that addresses these human rights 
violations. This would imply that when human rights violations are concerned, an actio popularis 
should automatically be possible.   
To make clear what this means, we would like to present the case of Elisabeth Cohen. In June 
2011, the Belgian parliament voted a law that is generally known as the „burqa ban‟. The law 
prohibits going around in public with a face that is not recognizable. Although it was clearly 
adopted to ban niqabs and burqas from the public sphere, it is formulated in general terms. 
Elisabeth Cohen is a Belgian woman living in Belgium. She is profoundly disturbed by this law, 
which she considers to be a type of religious prosecution. She does not want a law that endorses 
this type of prosecution to apply in her country. Elisabeth Cohen herself does not cover her face, 
nor does she wish to do so. She is not a Muslim; she calls herself an atheist (although she has a 
Jewish background). Elisabeth challenged the „burqa ban‟ before the Belgian Constitutional 
Court, and when we met her was considering challenging it also before the European Court of 
Human Rights. The Belgian Constitutional Court requires applicants to have an individual 
interest in the annulment of a legislative act and specifically does not allow an actio popularis. 
Hence, in order for her to have an admissible claim, Elisabeth‟s attorney formulated her claim as 
one concerning her (privacy-related) right to cover her face in public, by „oversized glasses, a 
shawl, a headscarf or an anti-bacterial face mask‟. Only at the end of her argumentation did she 
add that Elisabeth also had „an interest to live in a society that does not discriminate against 
religious minorities‟ and that in her opinion the face covering ban signifies a cultural 
impoverishment and a uniformisation that are not compatible with „the fundamental rights of the 
society in which she lives and which are recognized by the European Convention on Human 
Rights‟.5 Elisabeth‟s claim was found admissible on account of the potential application of the 
law to her as a person living in Belgium and going around there in public, not on account of her 
real concern about the application of the law to others who significantly differ from her, but 
whose fundamental rights she feels she is entitled to see protected.  
As the Belgian Constitutional Court found no violation of fundamental rights, Elisabeth wanted to 
discuss the possibility of challenging the Belgian „burqa ban‟ before the European Court of 
Human Rights. One thing she made very clear: she did not want the argument that would be made 
in her name in Strasbourg to be about the potential application of the ban to herself. She wanted 
the legal claim to reflect her real concern, which is a concern about the rights of others, and about 
                                                     
4
 Cf. UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration, Article 10: „No one shall participate, by act or by failure to 
act where required, in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected to 
punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing to do so‟. 
5
Belgian Constitutional Court, Judgment 145/2012 of 6 December 2012.  
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her right to live in a society that respects human rights. In this goal she could only be 
disappointed, as the European Court of Human Rights requires that the person, organization or 
group of persons that applies to the Court claims to be the victim of a human rights violation 
(Article 34 ECHR). 
If we look at international human rights law as a whole, standing rights to complain about 
violations that happen to other (unrelated) persons appear to be a matter on which there is no 
consensus.  
The United Nations treaty bodies accept that an individual complaint can be made on behalf of 
another, provided that this other person consents. The same principle applies before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. This solves Elisabeth‟s problem only in part as 1) it 
would narrow her concern to one about the application of the law in a specific case, whereas in 
reality it is a concern about the existence of the law as such and about all its actual and potential 
applications and 2) it would require her to identify an individual victim and obtain her consent, 
which is not particularly easy in this case, because the number of face veil wearers in Belgium is 
very small (estimated at maximum 250 individuals on a population of 11 Million), and the law 
has forced them indoors. 
The Inter-American system also allows individuals and organizations to act on behalf of a third 
person  without the victims‟ consent and even without the victims‟ knowledge. Even though it 
remains necessary in this system to identify concrete victims, it seems that this system would  
accommodate Elisabeth‟s wish. 
Hence, it is submitted that one very feasible way of taking seriously the claim of the universal 
spectator of human rights violations who does not want to be complicit in such violations is to 
recognize a universal right to legally challenge human rights violations.  As a minimum, it seems 
that such a right would have to apply to all supranational judicial and quasi-judicial human rights 
complaint mechanisms. Yet it is obvious that it would be very meaningful to also extend it to 
domestic judicial fora. It seems that a victim consent requirement (and even a requirement for the 
identification of concrete victims) are beside the point, as this is not about individuals or 
organizations defending the rights of others in the name of those others. It is about a separate 
interest/right of individuals in living in a society where human rights – not only their own rights, 
but also those of others- are respected, and of not becoming complicit in such violations – for 
instance because the violations are committed in their name in the case of a law voted by a 
democratically elected parliament, or because the violations are inherent in a societal structure 
from which the individuals benefit. 
It seems open to discussion how broad this universal individual standing right would be, and in 
particular whether some kind of link between the individual applicant and the state defendant is 
required. If one refers purely to the idea of universal spectatorship, such a requirement may be 
undesirable. Yet if one refers to the „right not to be a perpetrator‟ as the basis of the standing 
rights, it may be justified to limit standing rights to individuals who have certain links to the issue 
or the state. 
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This is still rather embryonic, yet what we hope to convey is that the artist touches upon 
something that is not  often discussed in international human rights law but that appears quite 
fundamental. International human rights law relies for its enforcement to a significant extent on 
peer pressure and peer review among states, e.g. in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe that supervises the implementation of ECtHR judgments, and in the Human Rights 
Council at the United Nations, as well as in bilateral and multilateral relations generally. It is 
common to express the breakthrough realization of human rights law as against national 
sovereignty as the recognition that how a state treats the people under its jurisdiction is not just its 
own business, but is also of legitimate concern to other states in the world community that 
commits to universal human rights protection. What the artist in this case has brought to the fore 
is that this state-based discourse cannot be the whole story of human rights. And that the point of 
universal human rights, is in the first place that the injustice suffered by one human being is of 
legitimate concern to another human being, because it is an affront to shared values of humanity 
that have been entrenched in a universal human rights protection enterprise.  With this procedural 
expression of the artist‟s claim, we feel that we grasp the core of this – this is about a human 
rights mechanism relying on human beings acting for human beings. In addition to states 
watching each other‟s behaviour, human beings can be the ultimate permanent peer review 
mechanism for human rights. 
4. Conclusion  
 
In our opinion, a serious enterprise of translating artistic appeals to international law into the 
language of international law, in the form of new or amended standards or procedures, should 
proceed from a collaborative dialogue among international lawyers, artists and art scholars.  
This paper has shown, using a concrete artistic case as a starting point, that artistic claims may 
indeed point toward normative renewal in international law, and that such renewal may take 
many forms: within international human rights law, we explored duties, substantive rights and 
procedural rights, all as potential legal conclusions from the same artistic claims. Similarly, we 
found that such claims may be translated in terms of radical normative reform, yet that this need 
not necessarily be the case: it may also concern the strengthening of existing standards, or support 
for developments that are underway.  
For us at least, this exploratory exercise has worked, in the sense that it has made us look at 
certain issues from a new angle, and has encouraged our creativity and our reflection on what is 
essential in this branch of international law. 
 
References 
A. Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography (New York: Zone Books, 2008). 
A. Azoulay, Civil Imagination. A Political Ontology of Photography (London: Verso, 2012a). 
A. Azoulay, „Potential History,‟ exhib. brochure (Leuven: STUK Arts Centre, 2012b). 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 4 NO 4]  
[13] 
 
A. Azoulay, „“The Family of Man”: A Visual Universal Declaration of Human Rights,‟ in T. 
Keenan & T. Zolghadr (eds), The Human Snapshot (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013a), 19-48. 
A. Azoulay, „Potential History. Thinking through Violence,‟ Critical Inquiry 39 (Spring 2013b), 
548-574. 
J.M. Barroso, 'Inaugural Speech at the International Conference "A New Narrative for 
Europe",'Berlin, Akademie der Künste, March 1, 2014. This speech will soon be available online 
via:http://ec.europa.eu/debate-future-europe/new-narrative/index_en.htm. 
G. Batchen, et al. (eds), Picturing Atrocity. Photography in Crisis (London: Reaktion Books, 
2012). 
R. Bleiker & A. „Kay, Representing HIV/AIDS in Africa: Pluralist Photography and Local 
Empowerment‟, International Studies Quarterly (2007) 51, 139-163. 
P. Claeys, „The creation of new rights by the food sovereignty movement: the challenge of 
institutionalizing subversion‟, Sociology 46 (5)(2012) 844-860. 
O. Enwezor, et al., Democracy Unrealized. Documenta 11_Platform 1 (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje-
Cantz,2002). 
S. Gregory, „Transnational Storytelling: Human Rights, WITNESS, and Video Advocacy‟, 
American Anthropologist(2006) 195-204. 
D. Joyce, „Photography and the Image-Making of International Justice‟, Law and Humanities 
(2010)229-249. 
L. Kennedy, „Photography & Human Rights‟, at 
http://www.photoconflict.com/casestudies/photography-human-rights/. 
S. Linfield, The Cruel Radiance. Photography and Political Violence (Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
F. Möller, „Rwanda Revisualized: Genocide, Photography, and the Era of the Witness‟, 
Alternatives35 (2010), 113-136. 
S. Moyn, 'The Future of Human Rights,' in K. Gregos and E. Sorokina (eds), Newtopia. The State 
of Human Rights (Ghent: Ludion, 2012), 46-56. 
P. Naftali, La construction du « droit à la vérité » en droit international, PhD thesis Université  
Libre de Bruxelles, 2012-2013. 
A. Noble, „Recognizing Historical Injustice through Photography: Mexico 1968‟, Theory Culture 
Society (2010) 27,184. 
S. Sliwinski, Human Rights in Camera(University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
H. Van Gelder, 'Art Research', in J. Wesseling (ed.), See it Again, Say it Again: The Artist as 
Researcher (Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011), 23-39. 
